

# **M**MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

by

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## MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

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**S**OVIET BEATING of the drums for Poland's plan to mark out a denuclearized zone in Central Europe makes that scheme a leading candidate for discussion if and when East and West heads of government get together in conference. The sharp tone of President Eisenhower's latest letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin, and objections raised to the Soviet approach to a top-level parley,<sup>1</sup> seemed calculated to cool Kremlin enthusiasm for such a meeting. However, when Red leaders make up their minds that something is in their interest, they are not easily deterred. The United States and Great Britain already have removed one obstacle to a summit session by withdrawing earlier insistence on a preliminary meeting of foreign ministers.

Western willingness to consider a heads-of-government conference—after the disappointing results of the Geneva conference in 1955 and the persisting deadlock in general disarmament negotiations—may be attributed in large part to pressure exerted by public opinion and by opposition political parties in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. The heavy weight of the arms burden, weariness over the never-ending East-West struggle, and impatience at the failure of those in power to dispel the threat of atomic doom have disposed many Europeans to favor any action which conceivably may put more promise in the future. The same feeling of frustration has assured a wide hearing for Poland's proposed atom-free zone and for plans to pull apart or disengage the potentially hostile forces facing each other in various parts of the world.

First suggested in the West, the idea of military disengagement was almost immediately adopted by the Soviet Union as the theme of its campaign for a summit meeting. Conceptions of what "disengagement" actually entails

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<sup>1</sup> Eisenhower, in the letter published Feb. 17, accused Bulganin of demanding "the right to veto discussion of the matters I believe vital to peace." He objected also to the tendency of Soviet leaders to treat the affairs of Eastern European peoples as "solely a matter of Soviet domestic concern."

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(whether prohibition of nuclear weapons, withdrawal of foreign troops, or formal neutralization) and where it would take place (whether in East and West Germany, a reunified Germany, a wider area from Norway to Italy, or across the world in Korea) vary with the advocate. But proponents of disengagement are one in saying that the present world arms race must be curbed. They are fearful that plans to establish ballistic missile bases in Western Europe and to meet any aggression with nuclear retaliation greatly enhance the risk of atomic holocaust.

There will be no early summit conference, it now seems plain, unless careful diplomatic soundings convince the western governments that there is reasonably good prospect that it will produce firm and worth-while agreements. Some of the government heads have appeared readier than others to meet the Russians, but all have insisted that there must be at least a moderate chance of success. If that chance is discerned and a summit meeting is held, the question of denuclearization or broader military disengagement will be high on the agenda. Even if the conference does not materialize, advocates of the current proposals are likely to go on pushing them as a way to ease world tensions and open the path to broader accommodation between free nations and the Communists.

#### **SOVIET SUPPORT OF POLISH DENUCLEARIZATION PLAN**

Poland's plan for a denuclearized zone was advanced by that country's foreign minister, Adam Rapacki, in the General Assembly of the United Nations on Oct. 2, 1957, and was formally renewed in December through diplomatic channels. The plan, as most recently outlined in a memorandum forwarded to interested governments on Feb. 17, proposed that the whole of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, West Germany, and Poland be constituted a territory in which no kind of nuclear weapons would be manufactured or stored; from which equipment and installations for their servicing, including missile-launching equipment, would be barred; and against which use of nuclear weapons would be prohibited.

The four states in the zone would formally undertake not to manufacture, maintain, or allow the location on their territory of nuclear weapons or related equipment. The United States, France, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia would undertake not to equip with nuclear weapons any of

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their forces stationed in countries in the zone and, in addition, would obligate themselves "not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets in this zone." To ensure enforcement of the obligations assumed, the Polish government proposed creation of a system of aerial and ground inspection administered by supervisory organs on which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact nations, and neutral countries might be represented. Details were left to be worked out by negotiation.

Whether or not the Polish plan was inspired by Moscow, it has had the consistent support of the Soviet Union. Bulganin endorsed it in his letters to Western heads of government in advance of the NATO summit meeting in mid-December, and again in his letter to President Eisenhower at the beginning of February. A Soviet foreign ministry spokesman repeated on Feb. 19, two days after publication of the Warsaw memorandum, that the Soviet government was ready to undertake the proposed obligations, "until an agreement is reached on the full banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons" everywhere, and noted that Czechoslovakia and East Germany had agreed to do the same. He implied that the question of controls could be settled at a summit conference. Moscow had already said it would accept some (unspecified) system of inspection.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet leaders thought so well of the Polish plan that they had talked in mid-January of the possibility of so extending the proposed zone as to form a denuclearized belt across Europe from north to south. Bulganin indicated in letters to the premiers of Denmark and Norway, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko indicated in conversations with Italian Communists and other leftists, that it would be a good idea to expand the atom-free zone to take in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden on the north and Albania and Italy on the south. Others suggested that the belt be carried on through the Balkans to the Middle East. The response was not such as to encourage the Kremlin to proceed along those lines, but on Feb. 20 it proposed denuclearization of North and South Korea.

The Polish memorandum of Feb. 17 voiced belief that

<sup>2</sup> A Moscow communique, issued Feb. 1 at the conclusion of a secret five-day meeting of Rapacki and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, expressed Soviet willingness to join Poland in "examination and implementation of an effective system of control in the proposed zone."

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acceptance of the proposal for Central Europe alone would facilitate the making of agreements to reduce conventional armaments and to reduce foreign armed forces stationed within the denuclearized zone. Reduction of foreign armed forces in West Germany and elsewhere in Europe is, of course, a prime Communist objective. Break-up of NATO is another. Western strategists fear that agreement to the Polish plan would contribute importantly to attainment of those objectives.

#### OPPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TO ATOM-FREE ZONE

When President Eisenhower replied on Jan. 12 to a letter he had received from Bulganin a month earlier, he asserted that "There cannot be great significance in denuclearizing a small area when, as you say, 'the range of modern types of weapons does not know of any geographical limit' and when you defer to the indefinite future any measures to stop production of such weapons." Speaking at the National Press Club on Jan. 16, Secretary of State Dulles stressed the paramount importance to the United States and other NATO countries of a strong military position, "including enough ever-present and ever-alert retaliatory power to deter Soviet aggression."

The key to American opposition to the Polish plan is that it would seriously reduce the power of the West to deter aggression in Europe. NATO's ground shield against invasion consists of only 16 divisions in all of Western Europe, whereas the Soviet Union is believed to have 22 divisions in East Germany alone. NATO forces depend on tactical nuclear weapons to overcome the preponderance of Communist ground strength, and they would be severely handicapped if such weapons could not be immediately employed in West Germany to combat an invasion mounted in conventional fashion.

Gen. Lauris Norstad, NATO commander, said on Feb. 17 that "Any plan or proposal which reduces or limits our ability to provide for the defense of our people and territory without giving us some positive security to offset this . . . must be rejected." It was for such reasons that the State Department, early in February, had called the Polish plan "extremely dangerous." The department's press officer pointed out again on Feb. 18 that the plan had "serious disadvantages from the standpoint of the security of the free world and the genuine relaxation of tensions." He

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said, however, that the United States was still studying the proposals.

#### ATTITUDE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS

The West German government, on the contrary, rejected the Polish proposal outright. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared on Jan. 15 that the Rapacki plan would mean the end of NATO and of liberty in Western Europe. The details made public in Warsaw a month later did nothing to change Bonn's position. A government spokesman said on Feb. 19 that the denuclearization scheme implied the indefinite partition of Germany and the permanent military superiority of the Soviet Union over the West.

French Premier Felix Gaillard asserted in a letter to Bulganin in mid-January that acceptance of the Polish plan would be only "to confirm the unhealthy situation in which Central Europe has found itself for ten years." Foreign Minister Christian Pineau voiced fear on Jan. 27 that nuclear disarmament would tempt the Russians to try to overrun Europe by conventional military means. The French foreign ministry said recently that it was studying the formal proposals from Warsaw, but it indicated no change of heart toward the plan. At the moment, France seems less interested in denuclearization than in preparations to develop its own atomic weapons and missiles, so that it can take a place alongside Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States as a nuclear power.

British Prime Minister Macmillan wrote Bulganin on Jan. 16 that he saw "obvious objections" to the Rapacki plan, but his promise to study it as a possible basis for alternative proposals represented a more accommodating attitude than that displayed by the United States, West Germany, or France. However, Macmillan took a firmer position in a House of Commons foreign policy debate on Feb. 20 and 21.

Although saying that disarmament appeared to be the most promising area of negotiation at a summit conference, the Prime Minister declared that the military balance between East and West must be preserved. He declared also that without adequate preparation of the Western position on the key problem of military disengagement, the result might be loss of West Germany, dissolution of NATO, and return of the United States to isolation. Presumably

in order to disabuse the Russians of any notion that denuclearization of Central Europe would open the door to limited war with conventional forces and weapons, a British White Paper on defense had warned a week earlier that strategic nuclear bombing would be the West's reply to a Soviet attack of any kind.

Spokesmen for the governments of most of the smaller NATO countries have been skeptical of the value of the Polish denuclearization proposals. Only Danish Premier H. C. Hansen has gone so far as to recommend that the plan be considered "as a contribution to the constructive thinking about ways and possibilities of progress in the cause of peace."

#### **PUBLIC PRESSURE IN EUROPE FOR BREAK IN TENSIONS**

Although Western governments have shown virtually no enthusiasm for the Rapacki plan, it has enlisted strong interest, if not support, among opposition political parties in several countries. That interest, in turn, reflects popular yearning for some way out of the arms impasse and the tensions it produces between East and West. Among the causative factors are misgivings of many Europeans about American leadership of the West; a widespread belief that the policy of rearming Europe to deter aggression and force Soviet concessions from a position of strength has failed; fear on the one hand that current policies are leading to nuclear war that will destroy Western Europe, and fear on the other hand that the United States will not answer aggression in Europe by nuclear retaliation when the result might be Soviet destruction of American cities. In addition to such doubts and apprehensions, there is always the dragging burden of defense costs to give novel disarmament or disengagement proposals an attraction which may be deceptive.

Factors of this sort have been particularly influential in Great Britain and West Germany, and the British Labor Party and the German Social Democratic Party have become vehement advocates of a new approach to East-West problems. In the recent foreign policy debate Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labor Party, included breaking of the disarmament deadlock and military disengagement in Central Europe among the broad objectives of Labor policy. The comprehensive plan for disengagement which he outlined went far beyond Poland's denuclearization proposal.



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It called for (1) gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland; (2) agreement to limit conventional weapons and ban nuclear weapons in those countries; (3) reunification of Germany; (4) a great power guarantee of the frontiers of the neutral zone; and (5) withdrawal of West Germany from NATO and of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland from the Warsaw Pact. Aneurin Bevan, who would be foreign secretary in a Labor government, appealed in the House debate for consideration of the Rapacki plan. In making a like plea on the radio, Jan. 9, Bevan had said the plan would provide "a first-class test of the sincerity of the participants."

Social Democrats in West Germany said on Feb. 19 that they would insist on an early Bundestag debate on the Polish proposals notwithstanding the government's objections to the denuclearization plan. The Social Democrats are of opinion that the plan would help to ease tensions and in the long run contribute to German reunification. Erich Ollenhauer, the party's leader, has accused Adenauer of sabotaging reunification and endangering world peace by bluntly rejecting Soviet overtures. The important thing, the Social Democrats insist, is to start talking. They see in the Rapacki plan a means of doing that; they seem to feel that if the plan's provisions are not satisfactory now, negotiations may lead to adjustments that will make the scheme worth trying.

#### **KENNAN PROPOSAL FOR NEUTRALIZATION OF GERMANY**

Several weeks before the Rapacki plan began to attract attention, the term and concept of military disengagement had been publicized by George F. Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. Kennan, in England as a visiting lecturer at Oxford, developed the theme in a series of radio talks there last November and December. He advocated a renewed Western effort to relax the Soviet stranglehold on Eastern Europe by withdrawing NATO forces from Germany and arranging for reunification and permanent neutralization of that country.

It was Kennan's thesis that Europe would never achieve freedom and peace so long as Soviet troops remained in Eastern Europe, including the eastern part of a divided Germany. However, it was not to be expected that Moscow would withdraw the Red army from Europe while

NATO troops camped along the Iron Curtain; nor could it be expected that the Soviet Union would consent to reunification of Germany if, as everyone now believed, a reunited Germany would join NATO. Finally, Kennan pointed to the hard fact that the Soviet Union could not be expected to yield to Western demands without a satisfactory *quid pro quo*.

The former ambassador, who as first director of the State Department's Policy Planning Board originated the containment policy adopted after the war,<sup>3</sup> did not specify the exact form which disengagement might take, how neutralization should be defined, how far NATO forces should be withdrawn, or what safeguards should be established. But he made it clear that he had in mind a withdrawal by both sides. "My plea," he said, "is not that we delude ourselves that we can have a German settlement tomorrow, . . . or make frivolous or one-sided concessions to obtain one." However, the West should acknowledge that "We have a problem here which must sooner or later be solved, and better sooner than later; and that we must do our best to see that the positions we adopt with relation to it are at all times as hopeful and constructive as they can be."

Kennan's observations provoked wide discussion and a considerable measure of favorable comment abroad, particularly in Labor and Liberal circles in Great Britain. Although the talks were rebroadcast in this country, they did not attract here a comparable measure of interest or approval. Special weight had been attached in Europe to Kennan's words on the assumption that he was likely to become Secretary of State in a new Democratic administration and, therefore, that he was to be considered a spokesman of the Democratic party. It was in part to correct any such impression that former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, under whom Kennan had served, issued a statement on Jan. 11 to the effect that "Mr. Kennan's opinion is not shared by any responsible leader in the Democratic party." Acheson asserted that "Mr. Kennan has never, in my judgment, grasped the realities of power

<sup>3</sup> Kennan outlined the containment policy in an article ("Sources of Soviet Conduct") published anonymously in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947. He said there that "The main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigorous containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Containment was to be accomplished by "the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." A policy of disengagement has been criticized as the opposite of a policy of containment.

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relationships, but takes a rather mystical attitude toward them."

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### **Growth of Deadlock Over Western Europe**

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MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT is not a new concept in Soviet-Western relations in Europe. Because Great Britain and the United States withdrew almost three million men from the Continent between May 1945 and May 1946, the Soviet Union was able without threat of external opposition to consolidate its hold over Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia (until Tito revolted), and finally Czechoslovakia.

Initiation in 1948 of the Marshall Plan to promote European recovery, and formation in 1949 of the North Atlantic alliance to strengthen European defenses, marked a significant joining together of Western economic and military resources to combat the rising threat from the East. These moves were met in time by Soviet campaigns for what might be called disengagement, whether by neutralization of various parts of Europe, abrogation of the NATO and Warsaw pacts, withdrawal of troops, abandonment of foreign bases, or banning of nuclear weapons. In return for Western concessions, the Soviet Union hinted occasionally that it might even play its trump card, control of East Germany, and agree to reunification of Germany without which, Western experts agree, there can be no permanent stability in Europe.

#### STALEMATE ON ISSUE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN EUROPE

Soviet objections to United States military establishments in foreign countries were voiced as early as May 1948. Foreign Minister Molotov attributed tense East-West relations at that time to the Marshall Plan, "the increasing development of a network of naval and air bases in all parts of the world," and the "military union of Western countries."<sup>4</sup> To obstruct formation of NATO in 1949, the Soviet Union bombarded Western governments

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<sup>4</sup> Letter to Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. The "military union" was the Western European Union, forerunner of NATO, set up under the Brussels Pact, Mar. 17, 1948, by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

with notes warning that rearmament would only delay a final European settlement. The undeviating Western reply, as expressed by Secretary of State Acheson in a speech on Mar. 16, 1950, was that if the Kremlin really wanted to relax world tensions, "Soviet leaders could withdraw their military and police force and refrain from using the shadow of that force" to keep puppet regimes in power.

The German problem was viewed by Soviet and Western leaders as the real stumbling block. The West has insisted since Yalta that free all-German elections under U.N. supervision must precede reunification. The Russians have demanded that a provisional government, including strong East German Communist representation, should be formed first to draw up rules and police the election. Although the Kremlin has stuck by this basic position, Soviet leaders have shifted their emphasis—since Germany began to rearm—to insist on demilitarization and neutralization of Germany as a preliminary to reunification.

From the time the Prague proposals for German reunification<sup>5</sup> were advanced by the Soviet Union and its East European satellites in October 1950, through the Berlin conference of foreign ministers early in 1954, there was complete East-West deadlock. The Soviet-supported North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 had convinced the West that simultaneous withdrawal of troops from nearby positions in strategic areas, in Europe or elsewhere, would be dangerous.<sup>6</sup> The cool reception given in Washington to recent proposals of North Korea and Red China for withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from North Korea and of United Nations forces from South Korea this year has indicated that that view still holds.

#### AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY, EDEN PLAN, GERMAN PROBLEM

Western hopes for changes in Soviet policy were raised after the ouster of Malenkov and the elevation of Bulganin and Khrushchev to power in Moscow in February 1955. The shift in leadership was followed by Russian action which put an end to years of Soviet stalling on the negotiation of a treaty to determine the future status of Austria. In return for Vienna's promise not to join "any military alliances nor allow military bases on its territory," the

<sup>5</sup> See "Defense of Europe," *E.R.R.*, 1951 Vol. I, p. 5, footnote 2.

<sup>6</sup> The last Soviet occupation forces in North Korea left that country at the end of 1948, not long before American occupation forces withdrew from South Korea.

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U.S.S.R. at last agreed to withdrawal of occupation forces—an objective long sought by the Western occupying powers.<sup>7</sup>

The theme of neutrality, especially German neutrality, thereafter came to the fore. The Soviet press acclaimed the traditional neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland, and Russian willingness to accept a simple declaration of neutrality from Austria, instead of an international guarantee, seemed to suggest a way out of the German impasse. If the German people were permitted freely to choose neutrality in return for reunification, East and West might be able to agree. However, Chancellor Adenauer refused to help promote what looked like a Soviet plan to develop a belt of neutral states across Europe.

At the Geneva summit conference in July 1955 British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proposed a three-point formula for European security: (1) An East-West security pact binding Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and a reunified Germany "to go to the assistance of the victim of aggression, whoever it might be"; (2) an "agreement as to the total of forces and armaments [to be stationed] on each side" in Germany and neighboring countries; (3) "a demilitarized area between East and West."

The Eden plan was tied to Soviet acceptance of free all-German elections. In the end, however, nothing came of either the Eden plan or of Soviet proposals for an all-European system of collective security which would have involved dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and withdrawal of foreign troops. At the autumn meeting of the foreign ministers, following the summit conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared that German reunification could not even be considered unless Germany was to be completely neutralized.

The chief Western gain from the short-lived "era of good will" was final settlement of the Austrian question.<sup>8</sup> Because the Soviet government refused to alter its position on Germany, Western leaders were skeptical about the real significance of the momentary easing of relations. The Soviet smiles of 1955 were widely interpreted as an effort

<sup>7</sup> At the treaty signing, May 15, 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared that Austria's new position of "honest neutrality" could have "important significance for the peace of Europe."

<sup>8</sup> In addition, the U.S.S.R. gave up naval bases in Finland and Manchuria. The Soviet withdrawals were accompanied by suggestions that the United States do likewise.

to divide the West, get its military budgets down, and win a German settlement on terms favorable to the Kremlin. In that light, neutralization of Austria did not appear to offer a valid precedent for handling the German question.<sup>9</sup>

Communist terms for German reunification, stiffer than ever, were set forth again by East German Premier Otto Grotewohl on July 27, 1957, in advance of the September election in West Germany. Grotewohl insisted that both Germanys would have to ban production and storing of nuclear weapons, as later proposed in the Rapacki plan; that it would be necessary for West Germany to withdraw from NATO and East Germany from the Warsaw Pact; that West Germany would have to halt military conscription; and that both states would need to agree on the size of military forces. Only then, Grotewohl declared, could a confederation be formed to negotiate for full reunification. The West reaffirmed, in the Berlin Declaration of July 29, the right of a reunited German people to determine "through their freely elected government whether they wish to share in the benefits and obligations of the [NATO] treaty."<sup>10</sup>

#### NUCLEAR BAN AND INSPECTION IN DISARMAMENT TALKS

More than a decade of disarmament negotiations has given East and West a forum for discussion of military disengagement suggestions. The West, in proposing a variety of plans for international control of atomic and conventional arms, has consistently stressed the need for adequate inspection.<sup>11</sup> The Soviet Union has combined a persistent demand to prohibit all nuclear weapons with an effective veto of every plan to police the ban. Between American proposals for international inspection and Soviet demands for a nuclear ban, the Rapacki plan may occupy a significant middle ground.

All Western efforts to put international controls on the use of atomic energy for military purposes have been thwarted. The Soviet Union rejected the original 1946 American proposal for an international atomic authority

<sup>9</sup> Henry L. Roberts in *Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects* (1956) raised the question (p. 176) that troubles most opponents of German neutralization. Even a "self-imposed neutrality" would probably not endure because "every economic, political, and military decision of a country of Germany's size, location, and potential strength would necessarily affect the European balance." Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would be likely to rebuff Germany if it chose to support one or the other despite a theoretically neutral status.

<sup>10</sup> See "German Election," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. II, pp. 605-621.

<sup>11</sup> See "Inspection for Disarmament," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. I, pp. 432-440.

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as infringing national sovereignty; it insisted that the right of veto would have to apply to inspection operations. Andrei Vishinsky, the Soviet delegate in disarmament discussions in 1952, proposed an inspection agency that would be expressly forbidden to intervene in domestic affairs.

New hope was injected into disarmament negotiations in May 1955, when Moscow proposed inspection at key transportation points to insure against secret large-scale troop movements. President Eisenhower at the Geneva summit conference advanced his celebrated "open-skies" plan, which would have required exchange of military blueprints and provided for aerial photography. But the open-skies plan was killed by Soviet insistence that it could be considered only as part of a broader scheme including reduction of armaments and a prohibition on use of nuclear weapons.

A note from Premier Bulganin in November 1956, to the effect that Soviet Russia was "prepared to consider" aerial inspection in an area extending 480 miles east and west of the Iron Curtain, again raised Western expectations. By the spring of 1957 the last obstacle to a limited inspection agreement appeared to be delineation of the boundaries of the areas to be subject to inspection. But on Aug. 27, the day after Moscow had announced successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Soviet Union turned down the plan. Valerian A. Zorin, the Soviet delegate at the London disarmament talks, said the West's "aggressive military groupings" and its bases "aimed directly against the Soviet Union" made it clear that the purpose of inspection by aerial photography would be "collection of intelligence information."

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### **Disengagement and European Security**

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RESULTS of disengagement proposals advanced in the past have not been encouraging. Fundamental questions confront Western governments contemplating negotiations with the Soviet Union. They must ask: What do the Russians really want in proposing summit talks? What priority should be given to the perennial problem of German reunification? And, finally, to what extent can the military posture of NATO be safely altered to meet Soviet objections?



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On the perplexing question of Soviet intentions, experts on American foreign policy disagree. George Kennan, who admits that he underestimated Soviet economic stability in 1947, pointed in his recent broadcasts to serious contradictions within the Soviet Union which may make the Reds more accommodating in Europe. He laid great emphasis on the challenge to Soviet Communist Party leadership that is offered by non-Communist scientists, industrial managers, and young intellectuals. The Communists, he suggested, may wish to put their own house in order. They might welcome a gradual, face-saving means of retreat for troops whose presence in Europe since the Hungarian revolt has been widely condemned.

Former Secretary of State Acheson asserted in his latest book that withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe would lead to immediate overthrow of the present satellite regimes. "This is to the Kremlin the ultimate disaster, and to forestall it all things would be dared and done." Until a "further process of evolution" takes place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Reds do not want any agreement, Acheson believes. Their current overtures seek only "to weaken Western resolution," to postpone West German rearmament, to encourage the British to spend less on defense, to deflect French attention toward North Africa, and above all to "separate Europe from America."<sup>12</sup>

The Russians, Secretary Dulles wrote in *Life*, Dec. 23, are trying to exploit their new-found scientific prestige to win a cheap diplomatic victory over the supposedly weary West. Quoting Lenin's dictum that Soviet "promises are like pie crust, made to be broken," Dulles concluded that "We cannot rely on a world-wide 'armistice' agreement, except as we can enforce it."<sup>13</sup>

Recent events have done little to clarify Soviet aims. Western diplomats suspect the Reds are more interested in disseminating propaganda than in reaching agreement, for the Soviet Union is in stronger position to oppose Western demands than ever before. Khrushchev in a late January speech at Minsk specifically barred any discussion of

<sup>12</sup> Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (1957), p. 93.

<sup>13</sup> At the National Press Club, Jan. 16, Dulles denied that the administration had renounced all possibility of negotiating with the Russians. He called negotiations on limited enforceable questions a "valuable tool" of diplomacy.



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internal affairs of the East European "peoples' democratic regimes." That would be "intolerable interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states," Bulganin declared in his letter to Eisenhower soon afterward. On the other hand, in an interview with a London *Times* reporter on Jan. 31, Khrushchev said the Soviet Union would welcome a solution of the arms question that would leave only militia-type forces in all countries.

#### SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

German reunification has always held top priority for the Western powers in any discussions with the Kremlin on European security. It is therefore significant that recent Soviet proposals do not touch that problem at all. Instead, they emphasize nuclear disarmament and neutrality for both Germanys.

Mounting evidence suggests that the Soviet Union does not intend to yield on the German question. A note to West Germany, Sept. 8, made the Soviet terms particularly onerous. Reunification would be possible only by direct negotiations between East and West Germany on a "step by step" basis, *after* West Germany had renounced NATO.

The Kremlin has been turning over to the Democratic Republic of East Germany an ever larger share of the authority originally exercised by Soviet occupying forces. The East German government, despite Western objections, now claims the right to regulate travel across its territory from West Germany to West Berlin. When Yugoslavia announced diplomatic recognition of East Germany on Oct. 15, West Germany immediately severed diplomatic relations. But most Western diplomats agreed that the West could do little to prevent an ostensible Soviet withdrawal from East German affairs.

Although the Western governments put German reunification ahead of most other objectives in Europe, some observers point out that withdrawal of troops or creation of an atom-free zone would have the value of lessening the likelihood of an accidental clash at arms. Others, however, view continued division of Germany as the real source of trouble and the troops and atomic weapons as merely symptoms of something wrong. President Eisenhower, in his Jan. 12 letter to Bulganin, deplored any action which would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany. He

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said it was unrealistic "to ignore the basic link between political solutions and security arrangements."

#### FOREIGN TROOPS AND ATOMS IN DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Presence of Soviet forces in Europe has led the United States to put primary stress on the military side of NATO rather than on political and economic aspects of the alliance. NATO and its forces have been regarded as a shield against Soviet aggression, and the U.S. and British strategic air commands with their nuclear bombs as the sword of massive retaliation hanging over Russian cities to deter aggression.

How the present military position of the West might be affected by a withdrawal of troops or establishment of an atom-free zone in Europe has been differently assessed. It has been suggested that the ability of NATO ground forces to stop Russian aggression is overrated.<sup>14</sup> But Dulles, Adenauer, Gaillard, Italian Defense Minister Taviani, and virtually all other responsible Western leaders have contended that an "open-city Europe," with U.S. forces back across the Atlantic, would rapidly become a Soviet sphere of influence. Even a limited transfer of troops from Germany to other countries would raise problems. Neither France nor Britain has room for large additional numbers of foreign troops. Hence it is not probable that the United States could maintain elsewhere across the Atlantic all of the forces it now has stationed in Germany.

Military strategists assert that banning atomic weapons in a given area would weaken the West far more than it would weaken the Soviet Union. Tactical atomic artillery, including Corporal, Honest John, and Matador missiles with which American forces in Europe are now equipped, are relied on to compensate for manpower differences. Henry A. Kissinger and others therefore argue that the United States never should agree to ban the relatively clean, tactical atomic weapons which would constitute the West's greatest asset in a limited war.<sup>15</sup> As G. F. Hudson, British historian, points out, "It is quite natural for the Russians

<sup>14</sup> The *Manchester Guardian Weekly* commented on Jan. 30 that the "principal objection to the Rapacki plan"—that it would "restore the former Soviet advantage in conventional weapons"—would be valid "if there were any likelihood that General Norstad's forces, with their atomic weapons, could stop an invasion—and do it without bringing on a total war." It was the *Guardian's* opinion that "In practice they are neither numerous enough to do so, even with their 'tactical' atomic weapons, nor could they hope to use those weapons without a high probability that total war would follow."

<sup>15</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957), pp. 269-316.

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to wish to arrange the terms of any possible fighting in their own favor, but that is no reason the West should agree to it."<sup>16</sup>

### WEST'S INSISTENCE ON THE NEED FOR MISSILE BASES

More important to NATO planners than the present status of overseas forces is the growing threat of Soviet long-range missiles. The Russian I.C.B.M., reportedly test-fired in August 1957 and said to be capable of striking within six miles of its designated target, may achieve a "very limited operational capability" as early as July 1958.<sup>17</sup> The Atlas, U.S. Air Force I.C.B.M., is not scheduled to go into full scale production until December 1959, and the Titan, a more complex Air Force missile of the same 5,500-mile range, is about two years behind the Atlas. Moreover, the Russians are believed to have intermediate missiles of a 700-mile range in production and in inventory, whereas the Army's Jupiter and the Air Force's Thor 1500-mile intermediates will not become operational until late 1958.

Even if the United States is not as far behind the Soviet Union in missile development as once thought,<sup>18</sup> Strategic Air Command bases at home and overseas may soon be endangered by Soviet missiles. With an estimated maximum warning time of only 15 to 30 minutes, a missile attack might destroy up to one-half of American manned air strength on the ground.

To counteract this dual threat to the present deterrent force of the United States, Western strategists have emphasized a need for missile bases in NATO countries. It was agreed at NATO's December summit meeting that intermediate ballistic missiles should be deployed "in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned." Control over firing of the missiles, which had worried many Europeans, will be shared by the United States with the country where the base is located. Ten missile battalions have been planned for continental Europe. Four more are to be established in Britain under an agreement signed Feb. 22. Location of the continental

<sup>16</sup> Article in *New York Herald Tribune*, Jan. 21, 1958.

<sup>17</sup> Army witnesses testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on Jan. 23 set the date almost a year earlier than had been previously suggested.

<sup>18</sup> Werner von Braun, U.S. Army missile expert, repeated on Feb. 2 an earlier estimate that the United States was about five years behind the Soviet Union in missiles. However, Hanson W. Baldwin wrote in the *New York Times*, Feb. 2, that "The median judgment is that the Soviet leads in I.C.B.M. development, but not by much; that she is perhaps a year to eighteen months ahead of us in the production of rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads with ranges up to 1,000 miles."

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missile bases depends on decisions at a NATO meeting in the spring and on negotiation of agreements with individual countries.

Two developments—full realization of expectations for the Navy Polaris, an intermediate missile to be fired from submarines,<sup>19</sup> or a high-level decision to rely on U.S.-based intercontinental missiles to defend all allied countries—might ultimately make it possible for the United States to do without overseas air or missile bases. But military planners are virtually unanimous in insisting, in the meantime, upon “a common military strategy in which all [NATO] partners can play a role.” The Rockefeller report of Jan. 5 on *International Security: the Military Aspect* explicitly condemned as a “factor making for instability” any “tendency on the part of some NATO allies to seek to escape their dilemmas by a policy of disengagement and neutralism.”

<sup>19</sup> Adm. William F. Raborn, head of the Polaris project, predicted on Feb. 20 that any significant target in the world would be within range of this 1,500-mile missile when it becomes operational in 1960.



